

The role of energy in Turkey-Russian relations: Is it a dependency or necessity?

Abstract. Relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation have a rich historical heritage. Economic and trade relations constitute the driving force behind Turkish-Russian relations. Russia has been one of the most important trade partners of Turkey. Trade volume between the two states has reached 26,309 billion USD in 2019, with Turkey's 3,854 billion USD worth of exports and 22,454 billion USD imports. A total number of 1972 projects with a total value of over 75,7 billion dollars have been realized so far by the Turkish contractors in Russia, while reciprocal investments have reached 10 billion dollars each.

Energy constitutes one of the most important elements of relations between Turkey and Russia. With TurkStream and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant projects, cooperation in the field of energy is being carried further with Russia, which is among the leading energy suppliers. TurkStream Natural Gas Pipeline has been inaugurated on 8 January 2020. Natural gas has the second-highest share in the Turkish energy mix at a rate of 32.5%. Nearly 55% of the natural gas is imported from one single source country, and nearly 85% of the current purchase agreements consist of long-term agreements that are based on the "take or pay" principle. The Russian gas and pipelines have critical importance in the natural gas supply of Turkey, and nuclear energy is being emphasized for the purpose of diversifying the resources. The share of nuclear energy in the Turkish energy mix is 0%, and the agreement in this field is made with Russia brings another dependency relation.

Keywords: Energy Resources, Renewable Energy Resources, TurkStream Natural Gas Pipeline.

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Introduction

Turkey is the only pluralist secular democracy in the Moslem world and has always attached great importance to developing its relations with other European countries. Historically, Turkish culture has had a profound impact on much of Eastern and Southern Europe. Turkey began "westernizing" its economic, political, and social structures in the 19th century. Following the First World War and the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, it chose Western Europe as the model for its new secular structure [1,2].

Cooperation in the field of tourism between Turkey and Russia constitutes another important aspect of bilateral relations. With more than 7 million Russian tourists in 2019, a new record was broken. Russian tourists are the first among the tourists visiting Turkey in recent years. Turkey has enjoyed an enhanced bilateral relationship with Russia, the relationship between Ankara and Moscow is principally based on energy security and domestic business interests, and has largely remained stable in times of regional turmoil. The intimacy of Turkish-Russia energy relations and EU-Russian regional antagonism makes transactional cooperation on energy demand the most likely of future scenarios [3]. A scenario in which both Brussels and Ankara will try to coordinate their relations with Russia through a positive agenda, in order to exploit the interdependence emerging within the "triangle".

Turkey has ever since closely aligned itself with the West and has become a founding member of the United Nations, a member of NATO, the Council of Europe, the OECD, and an associate member of the Western European Union. During the Cold War Turkey was part of the Western alliance, defending freedom, democracy, and human rights. In this respect, Turkey has played and continues to play a vital role in the defense of the European continent and the principal elements of its foreign policy have converged with those of its European partners.

Turkey and Russia are countries with growing international importance. Russian-Turkish relations go back a long way. Although there have been occasional fluctuations in these relations, rapprochement and cooperation are inevitable, because they require mutual interests in the international arena [4].

Turkey and Russia are in stable and friendly relations, primarily in the economy and energy field since the 1990s. Although they have suffered a deep trauma when a Russian warplane was hit by Turkey in November 2015, once again energy and economic relations have a great role to improve their relations [5-7].

Turkey is a strategic transit country located on the routes of energy flow between the leading supplier and the largest market in the region, Russia and the European Union (EU). Taking advantage of this geopolitical virtue, it aims to serve as a hub-and-spoke network that would transfer Russian gas to Europe, which is also vital to meet its domestic energy needs. Being both an aspiring energy hub and an import-dependent country, long-term stability in bilateral relations with market actors is a must for Turkey. However, ironically, Turkey's bilateral relations with Russia and the EU have been rather chaotic and characterized by political rifts and crises in recent years. Nevertheless, Turkey has been fairly able to maintain its energy security and develop even more ambitious energy policies in the last two decades.

This dyadic pattern of Turkey-Russia relations has been the dominant structure of the bilateral interaction throughout the twentieth century and is still valid for present-day politics as the coexistence of competition and cooperation will be one of the focus points [7,8]. The analyses on the recent developments in Turkey-Russia relations argue that the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia results from the multifaceted policy of Turkish officials who takes Russia as a balancing factor for Turkey's relations with the West [9].

On the one hand, the analyses on Turkish-Russian rapprochement in the 2000s have summarized the overall relations as "strategic," "deepened," "enlarged," and "multidimensional" with respect to the shared incentives in the region against the West and increased potential in several areas such as trade, tourism, investment, and energy sectors [10-15]. On the other hand, geopolitical crises such as the Russo-Georgian conflict, the civil war in Syria, the Russian jet shootdown by Turkish military forces, the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Turkey were interpreted as severe threats against the Turkish-Russian cooperation in energy as well as bilateral relations [15].

A short history of Turkish-Russian relations

The relations between Turkey and Russia, both of which share European and Asian features emanating from history, culture, and common geography, are deeply-rooted. Russian policy has always played an important part in Turkish history, dating back to the days when Turkey was the core of the Ottoman Empire. Historically, relations between the Ottoman Turkish and Russian empires were never particularly good or close and were punctuated by armed conflict [16-20].

Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia – ancestors of Turkey and Russia – were two dominant actors in the region having diplomatic relations for more than five centuries. However, this perennial history was characterized by reciprocal mistrust, structural conflicts, and endless wars, particularly from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries [21].

Turkish-Russian relations have a very deep-rooted history. The first Ottoman-Russian war, which took place between the years of 1676 and 1681, involved different battles in different periods. After the Prut Campaign of 1711, history witnessed the continuous development of Russia and the simultaneous decline of the Ottoman state, followed by frequent losses of land [22].

In the 18th century, Russia underwent a major change in economic, political, and cultural fields. The process of Westernization, or modernization, initiated by Peter the Great, [22, pp.42] and the decisions taken in this direction, provided a favorable basis for the Enlightenment Movement, coming

from the West towards the end of the 18th century. Peter the Great paved the way for the development of the social and cultural values of Russia, by not only making certain modernization decisions covering all areas of life but also adopting the principle of working as the basic philosophy of life [23].

Until the early twentieth century, these actors were competing with imperial ambitions in tumultuous geography for regional dominance [24]. Surviving through this everlasting competition in the region, both countries have established new political orders as global politics was reshaped in the aftermath of the First World War.

Following the establishment of the Kemalist regime in Turkey and the Bolshevik revolution in Soviet Russia, these historical arch-enemies developed cordial relations based on mutual interests thanks to a non-aggression pact called 31 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality [25-29].

The first serious tensions in bilateral relations emerged in 1936 during the Montreux Convention negotiations, which enabled Turkey to regain its control over the Turkish Straits via remilitarisation. The tensions reached a climax in the aftermath of the Second World War when on 19 March 1945 the USSR's Foreign Minister Molotov informed Turkey that the USSR was declining to renew the 1925 Non-Aggression Pact. When the Turkish government inquired of the conditions for a new agreement, it was informed by Molotov that, in addition to bases in the Straits, the USSR claimed some territory in Eastern Anatolia. Moreover, at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945), Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin attempted to revise the Montreux Convention. In March 1947 the Cold War lines began to emerge with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the USSR and Turkey were in different camps during the Korean War. Finally, when Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the Turkish-American alliance, as well as the Turkish-Soviet rift became institutionalized [30, 257-283 p.].

In the 1945 Potsdam Conference, Soviets' Premier Stalin's demands further deteriorated the relations as the USSR claimed territories in Turkey's northeastern provinces Kars and Ardahan, requested bases in Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, and revision of Montreux Convention regarding the status of the straits [31].

Stalin's II. Territorial and other demands on Turkey at the end of World War II decisively pushed the Turks West and towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which they joined in 1952. For the next fifty years, Turkey remained in a Western orientation.

The 1947 Truman Doctrine was a milestone in Turkey-Russia relations since it has laid the foundations of Turkey's alignment with NATO during the Cold War [31]. The doctrine addressed Soviet expansionism and the rise of communism towards the west by financially supporting the economy and military of Turkey, as well as Greece. Eventually, Turkey joined NATO in 1952, which officially remarked Turkey's position against USSR during the Cold War

Öniş and Yılmaz [32] describe Turkey-USSR relations during this period as "virtually frozen" although there were rapprochement efforts before the end of the Cold War. In the first half of the 1990s, Turkish-Russian relations are competitive, due to negative developments in the past. The second part was a transition period focused on cooperation with the new vision. As a result of the economic developments in this period, commercial relations deepened. Thus, progress has been made in the fields of politics and security. Developments in the political and security fields have paved the way for significant multi-dimensional partnerships [33].

Turkey's relations with Russia in the first half of 1990 were due to two different reasons. Firstly, Turkey wanted to evaluate the geopolitical space that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The slogan of this policy is "Turkish World from Adriatic to the Great Wall of China." (Aras & Fidan, 2009: 200). At the same time, the perception of security threats by Russia against Turkey in the collapse of the Soviet Union has disappeared. During this period, Turkey, took the side of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to break the influence of Russia in the Caucasus. Cooperation in the struggle against terrorism was the second reason, which constitutes an important dimension of cooperation between the two sides and enables the change of discourse in the following period. The "Protocol on the Prevention of Terrorism" signed in 1995 and the "Memorandum on Cooperation in the Field of Combating Terrorism", signed in 1996, are documents that the two sides say will not enter each

other's fields and will cooperate in Chechnya and PKK issues [25, pp. 126].

As a significant determinant in bilateral relations, energy interdependence is a major pillar of the Turkish-Russian rapprochement observed from the beginning of the 2000s [34]. Turkish-Russian alliance, which also brings about antagonism towards the EU, revolves around the EU's reluctance to Turkey's membership process coupled with Russia's historical and economic rivalry with Europe. Moreover, this interdependence is not only limited to continuous energy flow from Russia to Turkey but also supported, and even became more asymmetric, through the great projects such as TurkStream and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant [35].

The fact that the two countries have different perspectives on the situation brought about by the Syrian crisis has caused the deterioration of the strategic relations established since the early 2000s.

In early 2014, Russia's aggression against Ukraine that resulted in the annexation of Crimea was another challenge for Turkey and Russia's bilateral relations. The crisis in Crimea was a regional conflict of interests as well as posing a threat to the international power relations alongside other issues such as the Russo-Georgian War. Again, Turkey's strategy aimed at restoring the status quo without disrupting the national interests relied on energy collaboration via trade and pipeline projects that have been questioned during the crisis.

The meeting between Putin and Erdoğan at the G-20 Summit in Antalya on November 15, 2015, was the last meeting between the two leaders before the crisis following the downing of the Russian aircraft. The Russian Sukhoi SU-24 fighter's shootdown in June 2015 was one of the most severe challenges Turkish-Russian bilateral relations faced in recent years (Table 1). In short, the shootdown was caused by the violation of Turkish air space near the Syrian border by an unidentified jet, which has been warned several times before being downed by Turkish F-16, according to Turkey's officials (Nichols & Charbonneau, 2015). Thus, the plane crisis experienced in TurkeyRussia relations revealed the necessity of revising the relationship qualitatively [35].

Following the fighter jet crisis with Turkey, Russia continued to increase its military occupation in Syria and closed Syrian airspace to Turkish jets using its S-400 air defense missile system deployed at the Khmeymim base in Latakia. Moscow also began to improve its political and military relations with the Syrian Kurds PYD and its armed wing YPG, which are both viewed by Ankara as the extension of PKK. It also tried hard to exclude Turkey from the Syrian peace process and launched extensive anti-Turkish propaganda operations claiming that Ankara had been supporting ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria [36].

On the July 15, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, Russia giving support to the Turkish government, has contributed significantly to the improvement of relations. On August 9, 2016, the President of the Republic of Turkey R.T. Erdogan made his first overseas trip to Russia following the coup attempt (Kocak, 2017: 10-11). At the end of 2016, Turkey has taken steps to resolve the existing problems with Russia and reciprocal ice has melted. In this context, successive steps have been taken in the fields of tourism, trade, energy, and security. In this context, the relaxing of bilateral relations was reflected in the policies regarding the Syrian crisis.

Turkey, within the framework of the UN Charter as well as ensuring the security of borders also aimed to struggle with elements such as the ISIS and Syrian branch PYD / YPG of the PKK. In this context, Russia's opening "Syria's airspace" to Turkey, has been a turning point in bilateral relations behalf. Thus, Turkey has realized more useful the Operation Euphrates Shield. Russia's support for Turkey; the historically to pro-Western and NATO member Turkey, can be interpreted as attracting them into their ranks. Russia opened the airspace and territory of Syrian for the operations of the Turkish Army and Turkey has created a new diplomatic space between Russia and Iran [37].

Table 1

Turkey-Russia Political Relations Overview

Turkey-Russia Political Relations	
Positive Events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1992 The first in the history official visit from Turkey to Russia made by Hikmet Çetin - 1999 commitment of the Blue Stream project 2001 – Signing of the “Action Plan to Develop Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkey” - 2004 The visit of the President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to Ankara - 2009 The meeting of the Turkish President Abdullah Gul and the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev - 2010 Dmitry Medvedev’s official visit to Turkey - 2011 Admission of the visa-free travel scheme between Turkey and Russia - 2012 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation approved Turkey’s application to become a Dialogue Partner - 2016 Recep Tayyip Erdogan officially apologized for the Russian plane shot down
Negative Events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1994 The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh - 1996 Hijacking of the “Avrasya” ferry - 2001 Hijacking of the Tu-154M Russian plane - 2004 The Cyprus dispute - 2008 Russia-Georgia war - 2015 Turkey shot down Russian Su-24 warplane - 2016 Russia’s Ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov was killed

Resource: Öncel & Liapina, 2018: 81.

After centuries of confrontation, Turkey and Russia have managed to develop a closer relationship since the end of the Cold War. The peculiar model for the relationship has been driven by mutual economic benefits and the emergence of political interdependence, however asymmetric. The expanded geography of their interaction has not eliminated competition though they have stepped away from their historical antagonism. The two countries seem to manage well their single-issue cooperation in Syria, with occasional strains, keeping it separate from other problematic aspects of the relationship.

Turkey and Russia have a common history and have been maintaining neighborly relations for centuries. Those relations are not based only on the years of war but also on alliances, cultural interactions, neighborhood, and their political position in international relations as well. Accurate assessment of the impact of historical events and the subsequent process can only be achieved by learning and analyzing approaches from the perspective of all sides.

As a result, Russia is a global player and Turkey has leadership capacity at regional levels. It is thought that both states will be more effective in the international system in the coming period.

Turkey-Russia Energy Relations

The Russian Federation is one of the most important actors in the equation of global energy in terms of production, proven reserves, and its significance in international energy trade as one of the world's largest exporters of various kinds of energy resources. In terms of production, Russia remained the third-largest oil producer during 2018, with 11.4 million barrels per day, which increased by 1.6% over the previous year 2017. And that after both the United States with 15.3 million barrels per day and Saudi Arabia, Which has a daily production of 12.2 million barrels [21, 16 p.].

Russia also ranked second in the world in the production of natural gas in 2018 with a total of 669 billion cubic meters, an increase of 5.3% from the previous year, after the United States, which ranked first with a total production of 831.8 billion cubic meters [36].

In terms of proven reserves, Russia tops the world's natural gas with 1375 trillion cubic feet, equivalent to 19.8% of the world's proven reserves, about 3.6% difference of its nearest competitor Iran, whose territory contains 16.2% of the total proven world natural gas reserves (British Petroleum, 2019, P.30). (40) Russia ranks sixth in terms of proven oil reserves in 2018, with a total of 106.2 thousand million barrels, equivalent to 6.1% of the world's total proven oil reserves. While Venezuela on the top with around 303.3 thousand million barrels, followed by Saudi Arabia reaching 297.7 thousand million barrels, followed by Canada, which constituted 167.8 thousand million barrels, then Iran by 155.6 thousand million barrels, and Iraq in the fifth rank with reserves of 147.6 thousand million barrels [37].

One of the most crucial dimensions of cooperation between Russia and Turkey is the significant Turkish dependence on Russian energy sources, especially natural gas. By the end of 2018, Turkish imports of Russian gas amounted to 22.8 billion cubic meters, and in second place came Azerbaijan with 7.6 billion cubic meters, then Iran with 7.2 billion cubic meters. It is worth to be mentioned that Turkish natural gas imports from Russia constitute around 10% of total Russian global exports (British Petroleum, 2019: 40).

Turkey has had the fastest-growing energy demand among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in the past 2 decades. In this period, Turkey ranks second to China in the increase in electricity and natural gas demand in the world.

On the other hand, Turkey has a 74% import dependency to meet its energy demand. The versatile structure of Turkey's energy strategy and its energy import dependency brings international relations into prominence in this field. One of the main goals of Turkey's energy strategy is to diversify routes and resources to strengthen its energy supply security. Turkey also aims to contribute to regional and global energy security and to become a regional trade center in energy.

Turkey consumed about 45.3 billion m³ in 2019, a total of 483 million m³ of natural gas and production. The remaining producible reserve is approximately 3.36 billion m³. With the new fields discovered as a result of the drilling performed for natural gas in our country in 2018 and 2019, natural gas production has increased in the last two years, and production has increased by 20% in 2018 and 11% in 2019 compared to previous years.

Turkey is a poor country in terms of energy resources and Russia is a country exporting energy resources. For this reason, energy is the main factor affecting Turkey-Russia relations. Energy meets the most critical part of Russia's trade volume with Turkey because energy has the biggest share in Turkey's imports from Russia. Moreover, Turkey is the second-largest customer of Russian gas in the Western market that cannot be disregarded by Russia as an essential customer [38].

Energy relations between Turkey and Russia provide an excellent example of how energy and politics interrelate in countries with a historically up-and-down relationship.

The energy dimension of the two countries' economic relations started to gain impetus after the signing of the first economic and technological cooperation agreement in 1967. This agreement made possible the establishment of seven important industrial complexes, including the Seydişehir aluminum facilities and the Aliğa Petroleum Refinery, which were actually the first energy complexes in Turkey built completely by Russian labor, know-how, and technology. After the construction of the refinery was complete in 1972, Nikolai Podgorny, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, visited İstanbul to evaluate developments, marking the very first time a Soviet leader visited Turkey. As a result of this successful visit, a second agreement on economic and technological cooperation was signed in 1975, which enabled the construction of lignite-fueled thermal power plants in Çan and Orhaneli. On the same date, an agreement for the construction of a hydroelectric power plant in Arpaçay, which was planned to flow on the border of the two countries, was ratified in the

Turkish parliament. In 1986, after the signing of the first natural gas agreements between the two countries, a new era began. Ever since then, Russian gas imports have been a very important component

of Turkey's energy mix, bringing natural gas to the forefront of energy relations between the two countries.

Firstly, the bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia are defined through energy cooperation. To describe Russia as an economic partner, Erdoğan particularly emphasizes energy relations as it is the first and foremost issue to be mentioned apart from the other economic activities. Secondly, he states that the rational interests of Turkey as the main driving force behind Turkey-Russia relations. Turkey needs energy, and it is desirable to have cordial relations with Russia for the sake of economic concerns. Finally, Turkey needs Russia to maintain the geopolitical balance between east and west through strategic cooperation with Russia (Erşen & Çelikpala, 2019: 590).

Russia and Turkey also cooperate in the nuclear power industry. Turkey's first nuclear power plant will be built in Akkuyu with an estimated investment of US\$ 25 billion. The Akkuyu plant is being constructed by Russia's State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) in the southern Mersin Province on the Mediterranean coast. It consists of 4 units, each generating 1,200 MWt of electricity with a service life of 60 years.

For Turkey, Russian gas is one of the most viable alternatives considering price affordability and easy transportation. Furthermore, energy trade between Turkey and Russia does not rely on imports only but also on long-term investments in big projects such as TurkStream (Figure 1) and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant that will pay off in the future. With the investments, energy trade underpins the many-sided economic collaboration, which also involves trade in goods and services, and tourism.

February 1986, Soyuzgaseksport and BOTAŞ, the energy companies of the two countries, signed an agreement on natural gas purchases. In the agreement signed for 25 years, which will cover the years 1987-2011, the parties agreed on the purchase of 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. The first natural gas flow was carried out in June 1987 through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria via the Transbalkan gas pipeline. Turkey's dependence on Russian gas has also started the process with this agreement. In addition to this agreement in 1998, the parties will continue until 2022 and the parties have agreed to purchase 8 billion cubic meters of natural gas in addition to the mentioned pipeline. At the same time on 15 December 1997 between BOTAS and GAZEKSPORT with Blue Stream Pipeline from Russia to Turkey (under the Black Sea) were signed to project involving the flow of natural gas (Kolobov et al., 2006: 190-193).

Energy relations between Russia and Turkey gained a completely new dimension after 1991. The new geopolitical setting that emerged in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union intensified competition for the use and transportation of the Caspian's hydrocarbon resources. Energy resources in the Greater Caspian had previously been developed under the control of the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the newly-emergent hydrocarbon-rich states, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, started to cooperate with the West in the development of their resources and their transportation to the world's markets. Turkey and Iran, which share ethnic and religious ties with these countries, were the two possible transit countries for the transportation of the Caspian oil and gas to the West. After the United States passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Turkey remained the most likely transit country located on the route to the west.

The Russia -Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline, which enters the country from the Malkoçlar on the Bulgarian border, following the route Hamitabat, Ambarlı, Istanbul, Izmit, Bursa, and Eskişehir and reaches Ankara, is 845 km long. The construction works are started on October 26, 1986, and the pipeline reached its first stop, Hamitabat, on June 23, 1987. From this date, in addition to the domestic natural gas, imported natural gas started to be used in electricity production at Trakya Combined Cycle Power Plant in Hamitabat. The line reached Ankara in August 1988. Natural gas was started to be used in IGSAŞ (Istanbul Gübre Sanayii A.Ş.) in July 1988, in Ambarlı Power Plant in August 1988 and in residential and commercial areas of Ankara in October 1988. Within the process, the capacity of the Malkoçlar Metering Station on the Bulgarian border has been increased from 8 billion m³/year to 14

billion m³/year.

Within the scope of the 25-year Natural Gas Purchase-Sale, Agreement signed between BOTAŞ and Gazexport on December 15, 1997, natural gas is transported from the Russian Federation through a transit line under the Black Sea to Turkey. According to the agreement, 16 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year are supplied to Turkey.

Blue Stream Gas Pipeline (Figure1) has been constructed as three main parts;

- On the Russian territory, a Pipeline System between the Izobilnoye-Djubga with a total length of 370 km, consists of 308 km long 56 inç pipelines and 62 km long 48 inç pipelines,
- In the Black Sea pass, between Djubga and Samsun, there are 2 parallel lines of 24 inç diameter, each about 390 km in length,
- In the territory of Turkey, a Pipeline System of 501 km long 48 inç pipeline

The financing and construction of the part of the natural gas pipeline in the territory of the Russian Federation and under the Black Sea have been carried out by the GAZPROM Company and the financing and construction of the Turkish section by BOTAS. The construction of the Pressure Reducing and Metering Station in Samsun-Durusu has been completed on October 15, 2002.

The Turkish part of the Blue Stream Project starts from Samsun and reaches to Ankara via Amasya, Çorum, and Kırıkkale. It is connected to the Main Line near Polatlı. The pipeline was taken into operation on February 20, 2003, and the official opening ceremony was held on November 17, 2005.

In the 2000s, energy played a pivotal role in Turkish-Russian relations. The political stability and economic prosperity of Putin's Russia and Erdoğan's Turkey, especially in the past decade or so, greatly contributed to the development of stronger bilateral links. In Putin's era, Russia started to overcome the difficulties stemming from its transition to capitalism while Turkey had substantially overcome the economic and political crises it experienced during 1990.

Turkey will strive to diversify gas supplies from Russia, as the events of 2015 showed that interdependence and balance in bilateral relations could be broken in the direction of Moscow's dominance. The current need of the Turkish economy in natural gas is 53 billion cubic meters of them, Russia accounts for 29 billion cubic meters which is more than half. The commissioning of the gas pipeline from Azerbaijan will reduce the volume of Russian supplies by 6 billion m³ /year, and the connection of Turkmenistan to the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline in the future may reduce its dependence on Moscow.



Figure 1. Russia-Turkey Gas Pipeline Plans

Resource: Mikhelidze & Sartori & Tannisever & Tsakiris 2017: 6.

Ankara's energy strategy provides for the transformation of Turkey into a promising South European energy hub, therefore it is beneficial for Turkey to transport gas from Russia and Azerbaijan through its territory, in the future the possibility of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan joining this project will expand cooperation within the framework of the Turkic Council.

Energy policymakers in Ankara have repeatedly stressed that one of their aims is to promote Turkey as an energy hub and that cooperation with Russia will not jeopardize this goal. Turkish Stream will most probably not threaten Turkey's prospects of becoming an energy hub given that other gas pipeline projects are going ahead. Work is accelerating on constructing the EU-backed Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) to carry gas initially from Azerbaijan to TAP, and then to Europe via Turkey. Gas from other suppliers such as Turkmenistan or northern Iraq could later connect with TANAP. Moscow would prefer not to face such competition, but Brussels is keen for EU member states to be less dependent on Russian gas imports. Turkey has the potential to increase its importance as an energy transit state, although more market reforms are needed to make Turkey an effective energy hub, and to attain its aspiration of becoming the region's "most important gas distribution point" (Bochkarev & Özdemir 2016).

Russia prioritizes energy to regain its regional power and even its old superpower with the help of Putin taking the lead of Russia in the 2000s. Generally, Russia wants to show in the field of energy and reserve of natural gas advantages to the whole world. Energy relations between Turkey and Russia gained a remarkable impetus owing to the pragmatic and strong leadership of Erdoğan and Putin from 2004 to 2010. The Russian sale of natural gas to Turkey has gone through three stages: the period between 1984 and 1992, the period between 1992 and 1997, and the period from 1997 to the present. In the first period, the relationship was both an economic and a political one. In the second period, the issue of energy became a commercial one with less focus on political and strategic concerns. In the third period, economic relations began to have a political face again (Ulçenkko, 2001). Overall, there were increasing economic relations between Russia and Turkey surrounding the energy issue as Turkey began relying even more heavily on Russia.

In addition to its economic and material sustainability, the political implications of energy security highlight the need for a foreign policy that secures the energy trade with Russia considering that the share of Russian gas consisted of 46.95% of the Turkish energy mix in 2018.

Considering the interplay between energy and Russian foreign policy, the future of cooperation between Russia and Turkey through energy projects is mainly linked to the continuation of friendly relations between them (Demiryol, 2015). According to the estimations, Akkuyu will meet 6% of Turkey's energy needs in 2030 (Özel & Uçar, 2019: 23). Considering that Russian state company Rosatom will hold the ownership of the plant for 25 years, it is possible to argue that asymmetrical interdependence Turkey-Russia relations would remain a persistent dynamic.

The important energy relationship between Turkey and Russia stands poised to continue for the foreseeable future in spite of any possible future downturns in political ties. Given the interdependence of this relationship, it is able to weather the most serious of crises, as seen in the case of Syria. There may be future disputes over gas pricing, the funding of energy projects, and other technical issues, but Ankara and Moscow appear destined to remain key energy partners.

Turkey has enjoyed an enhanced bilateral relationship with Russia, augmenting its position and relevance in a strategic energy relationship with the EU. The relationship between Ankara and Moscow is principally based on energy security and domestic business interests and has largely remained stable in times of regional turmoil. The intimacy of Turkish-Russia energy relations and EU-Russian regional antagonism makes transactional cooperation on energy demand the most likely of future scenarios. A scenario in which both Brussels and Ankara will try to coordinate their relations with Russia through a positive agenda, in order to exploit the interdependence emerging within the "triangle".

Increasing the Turkish economy's energy efficiency is an absolute necessity. Also, we must make a concerted effort to move rapidly towards more diverse and sustainable sources of energy. This move depends on the aggressive development and deployment of more sustainable energy resources and

alternative fuels. Both Turkey and Russia attach importance to the principle of “mutual benefit” in energy relations—any project or area of cooperation must serve the interests of both countries. Natural gas is only one aspect of their comprehensive relations. The “mutual benefit” or “win-win” principle, often referred to by Prime Minister Erdoğan, aims to establish a balanced interdependence between the two countries, which makes it possible for Turkey and Russia to cooperate on such large projects as the Blue Stream pipeline and more recently the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project.

Energy and construction have been the two main areas of investment for Turkey and Russia. While the Turkish construction firms started operating in Russia right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the Turkish energy in terms of oil and natural gas was provided by Russia.

The state of cooperation and even interdependence between the Russian and Turkish parties in the energy field has overshadowed all political interactions between the two partners to the extent that it has influenced Russian foreign policy towards Turkey. Despite the eruption of many events that almost disturbed those relations, the energy determinant had the most considerable influence in calming the atmosphere between the two parties.

Russia announced in September 2017 that it had signed a \$2.5 billion deal with Turkey on the delivery of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems to Ankara. Under the contract, Ankara received a regiment set of S-400 air defense missile systems (two battalions). The deal also envisages partial transfer of production technology to the Turkish side. Turkey is the first NATO member state to purchase such air defense missile systems from Russia. The deliveries of S-400 launchers to Turkey began on July 12, 2019.

Conclusion

The relationship between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey is one of the most important bilateral relationships in Eurasia today. The relations between Turkey and Russia, both of which share European and Asian features emanating from history, culture, and common geography, are deeply-rooted. It is accepted that the diplomatic relations between the two countries began with the formal request by Czar Ivan the 3rd to send a diplomatic delegation to İstanbul in 1492. Turkey recognized the USSR in 1920 and the Soviet Union was the first Great Power that recognized the Government of Ankara during the Turkish War of Liberation. Bilateral relations gained ground and new opportunities and perspectives for cooperation emerged along with Russia’s orientation towards a pluralistic democracy and market economy after the end of the Cold War era. Both countries took steps towards strengthening mutual trust and good neighborliness as well as diversifying areas of cooperation by utilizing opportunities to improve bilateral relations. These steps yielded positive results.

Turkey recognized the Russian Federation, the successor of the USSR and the visit of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Mr. Hikmet Çetin in 1992 was the first official visit from Turkey to this country. This was followed by the visit of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Andrei Kozyrev to Turkey and the visit of the then Prime Minister of Turkey Mr. Süleyman Demirel to Russia in the same year. During the visit of Mr. Demirel, the "Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation" was signed on May 25, 1992.

The high-level political dialogue between Turkey and Russia, which has gained momentum and a regular character, plays a constructive role in terms of eliminating possible misunderstandings through direct contacts; moreover, it facilitates the implementation of concrete measures in various areas of relations.

The high level of economic relations between Turkey and Russia has become the most important component of our bilateral multidimensional relations. Economically, the relationship has been historically unbalanced in Russia’s favor, but Turkey’s increasing trade in services and emergence as important energy storage and transport hub may change this. The two economies share a basic complementarity, with few areas where they compete in the production of goods and services.

This dynamic may increase the ability of their economic relationship to act as a “shock absorber” and minimize the impact of disruptions in other facets of their ties.

Turkey-Russia energy relations improved in connection with Turkey’s increasing energy need in the twenty-first century. With its rich energy resources, Russia was an important supplier country in terms of Turkey. With its increasing energy needs, Turkey has been an important income supply for Russia’s economy. Energy trade which started in the oil and coalfield moved to the natural gas field over time and lastly, two countries have agreed to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant.

Currently, economic relations between Russia and Turkey present opportunities and challenges for both countries. Russia traditionally exports oil, gas, and metals to Turkey, and imports some manufactured goods. For its part, Turkey is a popular destination for Russian tourists, and many Turkish employees work on ongoing construction projects in Russia.

One more important sector in Russian-Turkish economic relations is tourism. Special attention must be paid to the fact that as bilateral trade between Russia and Turkey has been always based on strategic goods such as natural resources and food, both of the countries are obliged to be more prudent while building their political relations.

Turkey-Russia bilateral economic relations, Turkey is rather more sensitive to any political shocks due to the high elasticity of demand for goods exported by this country, while the majority of goods exported by Russia, natural fuel and raw materials, have a low elasticity of demand. Therefore, it is expected that any betterment in political relations between Russia and Turkey will rather affect the export from Turkey, which will increase the Turkey-Russia trade balance.

Even though Turkey has a deficit of the bilateral trade balance with Russia, mostly caused by the import of energy resources, its income from Russian tourists and civil engineering projects in Russia assist in closing the gap. Special attention must be paid to the fact that as bilateral trade between Russia and Turkey has been always based on strategic goods such as natural resources and food, what makes both of the countries be more prudent while building their political relations.

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Түрік-ресей қатынастарында энергияның рөлі: тәуелділік пе, қажет пе?

Аңдатпа. Түркия мен Ресей Федерациясының қарым-қатынасы бай тарихи мұраға негізделген. Экономикалық және сауда қатынастары түрік-ресей қарым-қатынастарының қозғаушы күші болып табылады. Ресей Түркияның ең маңызды сауда серіктестерінің бірі болды. Екі ел арасындағы сауда 2019 жылы 26 309 миллиард долларға жетті, Түркияның экспорты 3 854 миллиард доллар, импорты 22 454 миллиард доллар болды. Барлығы Ресейдегі түрік мердігерлері жалпы сомасы 75,7 миллиард доллардан асатын 1972 жобаны жүзеге асырды, ал өзара инвестицияның әрқайсысы 10 миллиард долларға жетті.

Энергетика – Түркия мен Ресей арасындағы қарым-қатынастың маңызды элементтерінің бірі. «Түрік ағыны» және «Аккую» АЭС жобалары арқасында жетекші энергия жеткізушілерінің бірі болып табылатын Ресеймен энергетика саласындағы ынтымақтастық жалғасуда. «Түрік ағыны» газ құбыры 2020 жылдың 8 қаңтарында ашылды. Түркияның энергия балансының құрылымында табиғи газ екінші орында - 32,5%. Табиғи газ 55% дерлік бір көзден алынатын елден импортталады және ағымдағы сату-сатып алу келісім-шарттарының 85% дерлік ұзақ мерзімді алу немесе төлеу келісімдері болып табылады. Ресей газы мен құбырлары Түркияға табиғи газ жеткізу үшін өте маңызды; ресурстарды әртараптандыру үшін ядролық энергетикаға баса назар аударылады. Түркияның энергетикалық теңгеріміндегі атом энергиясының үлесі 0 пайызды құрап, бұл саладағы Ресеймен келісім тағы бір тәуелділік қатынасын туғызады.

Түйін сөздер: энергия ресурстары, жаңартылатын энергия көздері, «Түрік ағыны» газ құбыры.

Evren Atış¹, Erol Kapluhan²¹Университет Кастамону, Кастамону, Турция²Бурдурский университет имени Мехмета Акифа Эрсоя, г.Бурдур, Турция**Роль энергетики в турецко-российских отношениях: зависимость или необходимость?**

Аннотация. Отношения между Турцией и Российской Федерацией опираются на богатое историческое наследие. Экономические и торговые отношения являются движущей силой турецко-российских отношений. Россия была одним из важнейших торговых партнеров Турции. Объем торговли между двумя странами в 2019 году достиг 26 309 млрд долларов США, при этом объем экспорта Турции составил 3 854 млрд долларов США, а импорта - 22 454 млрд долларов США. Всего турецкими подрядчиками в России реализовано 1972 проекта на общую сумму более 75,7 миллиарда долларов, а взаимные инвестиции достигли 10 миллиардов долларов каждый. Энергетика - один из важнейших элементов отношений между Турцией и Россией. Благодаря проектам «Турецкий поток» и АЭС «Аккую» продолжается сотрудничество в области энергетики с Россией, которая входит в число ведущих поставщиков энергии. Газопровод «Турецкий поток» был открыт 8 января 2020 года. Природный газ занимает второе место в структуре энергобаланса Турции - 32,5%. Почти 55% природного газа импортируется из одной страны-источника и около 85% текущих договоров купли-продажи состоят из долгосрочных соглашений, основанных на принципе «бери или плати». Российский газ и трубопроводы имеют решающее значение для поставок природного газа в Турцию; упор на ядерную энергию делается с целью диверсификации ресурсов. Доля ядерной энергии в энергобалансе Турции составляет 0%, и соглашение в этой области, заключаемое с Россией, порождает еще одно отношение зависимости.

Ключевые слова: энергоресурсы, возобновляемые источники энергии, газопровод «Турецкий поток».

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